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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant argues herein that the counterclaim which was
originally asserted was abandoned by merger into the pre-trial
order.

The appeal is, consequently, properly before the Court.
The arguments

advanced

by plaintiff

which

claim the

Liability Reform Act does not apply to this case have been considered and rejected by another court because they fail to fully
address the vesting of substantive rights.
Legislative

intent

is not helpful

under the circum-

stances of this appeal because plaintiff attempts to substitute
intent for established rules of law.
Finally, the acts of John Doe were intentional as shown
by the evidence or at least the jury should have received the
opportunity to apply the standard of care for intentional torts
by receiving the rejected instruction number 27.

ARGUMENT
I.
THE APPEAL IS PROPERLY
BEFORE THE COURT
Plaintiff

argues

in

her

brief

that

a

counterclaim

orginally filed with the answer to the complaint, but not considered

at trial, renders

the
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judgment

not

ripe

for appeal.

However, page

5 of

the Respondents

Brief

indicates

that no

objection is made to this appeal being heard by the Court and a
review of the record shows that the counterclaim was abandoned
prior to trial.
There

is no specific

reference

formal disposition of the counterclaim.

in the record

to a

However, an examination

of the complete record will show that the counterclaim was not
asserted at trial and was abandoned.

While it would have been

better form to have had a formal record of the dismissal of the
counterclaim, the very nature of the*claim, as pointed out by the
plaintiff, is such that jury verdict implies that the counterclaim

would

not have been successful.

The point raised is,

therefore, moot.
Finally, the pre-trial order of the court, at R., p.
205, reduces the claims of the parties to their final form.

As

the pre-trial order shows, the counterclaim was not reserved at
the time the pre-trial order was entered and was eliminated by
merger of the pleadings into the order.
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II.
THE LIABILITY REFORM ACT'S PROVISION
ELIMINATING JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY
SHOULD HAVE BEEN APPLIED TO THIS CASE
BECAUSE IT AFFECTS NO SUBSTANTIVE
RIGHT WHICH HAS VESTED
In her brief, plaintiff argues that the provisions of
the Liability Reform Act eliminating joint and several liability
should not be applied to this case.
II).

(Brief of Respondent, Point

In both defendant's principal brief and plaintiff's respon-

sive brief, there is substantial discussion regarding retroactive
versus prospective application and substantive versus procedural
rights.

A close examination of the recent Arizona Supreme Court

Case of Hall v. ANR Freight System, Inc., 717 P.2d 434 (Ariz.
1986) will

serve

to focus more clearly

the argument made by

defendant in his brief and to show the fallacy of the arguments
presented in plaintiff's brief.
In Hall, the Arizona Supreme Court considered whether
Arizona's Uniform Contribution Among Tort-Feasors Act was constitutional

when, by

accidents occurring

its

terms,

it

applied

retroactively

to

before the effective date of the statute.

While the Hall case deals specifically with contributory negligence rather than joint and several liability, the analysis used
by the Arizona Supreme Court is entirely applicable to this case.
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In the present case, plaintiff's argument is basically
that (1) substantive legal rights may not be retroactively impaired, (2) joint and several liability is a substantive right,
and, therefore, (3) joint and several liability may not be retroactively

impaired.

A similar argument concerning contributory

negligence was involved

in the Hall case.

In that case, the

Arizona Supreme Court stated as follows:

"The defendant's argument may appropriately be cast as a syllogism.
Simply
put, defendant argues that: (1) substantive legal rights may not be retroactively impaired, (2) contributory negligence
is a substantive legal right, thus (3)
contributory negligence may not be retroactively impaired. From this conclusion,
the defendant explains, it is but a short
step to the judgment that the Act, by
encompassing past events, retroactively
divests the defendant of common law
contributory negligence as a bar to
recovery and is therefore constitutionally infirmed. While we have no quarrel
with the merits of deductive reasoning,
we must eschew the tempting simplicity of
defendant's analysis, which, though a
correct statement of the law, belies an
underlying morass of semantic confusion." Id. at p. 442.
The Court then agreed

with defendant's premise that

contributory negligence is a substantive legal right but continued as follows:

-4-

"However, the determination that contributory negligence is a substantive legal
right merely begins, rather than concludes, our discussion. 'Substantive' is
merely a label we apply to certain legal
rights. The conclusion that a particular
legal right is substantive, in contrast
to procedural, does not mean that it can
never be modified or abolished by the
legislature. 'The rule is that any right
conferred by statute may be taken away by
statute before it has become vested.'
The rule is the same for the common
law."
Id. at p. 442. (Citations omitted) .
The Court, therefore, was ". . . squarely faced with
deciding what is meant by 'retroactive' in the shibboleth 'substantive rights may not be retroactively impaired.'1'
443.

Id. at p.

In addressing that question, the Court stated as follows:

"When the defendant asserts that substantive legal rights cannot be retroactively
impaired, he cannot mean that substantive
rights may never be altered.
Such a
contention would sweep far too broadly,
since substantive rights, whether statutory or common law, may be abrogated
before vesting. . . .
Nor can the defendant be heard to say
that the prohibition against retroactive
legislation means that statutes cannot
affect past events.
In Arizona it is
conclusively settled that laws are not
retroactive simply because they relate to
past events. . . .
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. . . Clearly, the mere fact that the Act
applies to prior accidents does not make
the Act retroactive in effect. Nor does
the fact that the Act affects a substantive legal right render it retroactive.
The critical inquiry in retroactivity
analysis is not whether a statute affects
a substantive right but whether a statute
affects a vested right. Thus the implicit meaning of the statement 'substantive
rights may not be retroactively impaired'
is 'substantive rights may not be impaired once vested. '"
Id. at pp. 443, 444
(Emphasis in original).
The focus of

inquiry, therefore, is not so much on

whether the right is substantive as on whether the right has
vested.

Accepting as correct plaintiff's argument that the right

to joint and several liability is a substantive right does not
end the inquiry.

A determination must still be made as to when

the right actually vests.

In that regard, the Arizona Supreme

Court in the Hall case stated as follows:

"Rights are vested, in contradistinction
of being expectant or contingent. They
are vested, when the right to enjoyment,
present or prospective, has become the
property of some particular person or
persons as a present interest. They are
expectant when they depend upon the
continued existence of the present condition of things until the happening of
some future event. They are contingent
when they are only to come into existence
on an event or condition which may not
happen or be performed until such other
-6-

event may prevent their vesting." Id. at
p. 444.
(Quoting Steinfeld v. Neilsen,
139 P. 870f 896 (1913)).
See

also, Silver

King

Commission, 2 Utah 2d

Coalition

Mines

1, 286 P.2d

Company

v.

Industrial

689 (1954) where the court

stated "that a right is not 'vested1 unless it is something more
than such a mere expectation as may be based upon an anticipated
continuation of the present laws."
Applying

Id. at p. 692.

the foregoing principles to the doctrine of

joint and several liability involved in this case leads to the
inescapable conclusion that the right to joint and several liability does not vest until judgment is obtained.

This principle

can be demonstrated by examining the various points of time at.
which it might be argued that the right vests.
The first such point of time is that which plaintiff
asks this court to accept, namely, the time the underlying cause
of

action

accrues.

This

argument

suggests

that

a plaintiff

injured by multiple tort-feasors has somehow acquired a present
interest above and beyond those rights acquired by a plaintiff
injured

by a single tort-feasor.

What that present

interest

consists of under plaintiff's argument is impossible to define.
A plaintiff

injured by multiple tort-feasors acquires no addi-

tional cause of action by virtue of the doctrine of joint and

-7-

several liability.

He or she may not employ any different pro-

cedure during the prosecution of such an action other than that
which

could

feasor.
expect

be employed

in an action against

a single tort-

The most that can be said is that the plaintiff may
at

some

future

point

to enforce

a judgment

against one of those multiple tort-feasors.

entirely

But that expectation

is dependent upon some future event, namely, entry of a judgment.
That event may never happen.

Such an expectation of a future

happening is not a present interest which would cause plaintiff's
right in joint and several liability to vest.
The next point of time at which it might be argued that
the right to joint and several liability vests is at the time the
action is commenced.

However, the argument that the right to

joint and several liability vests at that time suffers from the
same infirmities as the argument just discussed.
The only reasonable conclusion as to when the right to
joint and several liability vests is that it vests at the time
judgment is entered.
plaintiff

acquires

At that time, and only at that time, a

a present

interest

plaintiff did not previously have.

or

a right which

that

It is only after judgment has

been entered that plaintiff may take some affirmative action by
virtue of

the doctrine of joint and

several liability.

The

doctrine allows the plaintiff to enforce or collect the judgment
-8-

entirely

from

any

one

of multiple

judgment

debtors.

Before

judgment is entered, plaintiff has nothing more than an expectation that once judgment is entered, plaintiff may collect 100% of
the judgment from any of the multiple tort-feasors.

The only

reasonable and logical conclusion is that the right to joint and
several liability vests at the time judgment is entered.

Accord-

ingly, if judgment had not been entered prior to the effective
the Act, the plaintiff fs right

date of

to joint

and

several

liability was extinguished.
This conclusion has the added benefit of resolving what
otherwise would be a conflict between the Liability Reform Act's
provision eliminating joint and several liability and that abolishing

contribution.

several

liability

Under

plaintiff's

is abolished

only

argument,

joint

and

in those cases where the

underlying cause of action arose after the effective date of the
Act.

If a plaintiff's cause of action arose before the Act's

effective date, that plaintiff would be entitled to collect 100%
of his judgment from any of the joint tort-feasors even though
the judgment is entered and collection is made after the Act's
effective

date.

That

situation

creates

a problem, however,

because of the Act's provision eliminating the right to contribution.

The Liability Reform Act abolishes the right to contri-

bution of any joint tort-feasor who had not, before the effective
-9-

date of the Act, paid more than his pro rata share of liability.

The result is that a joint tort-feasor might be obligated

to pay 100% of the judgment and yet be left without the ability
to collect contribution from the other joint tort-feasors.

The

only way to avoid that unjust result under plaintiff's argument
is for this Court to ignore the law regarding when the right to
contribution vests and to rule that contribution is still available in all cases where the underlying cause of action arose
before the Actfs effective date.
By contrast, the argument advanced by defendant avoids
any conflict between the Act's provision eliminating joint and
several liability and that abolishing contribution.

Under defen-

dant's argument, every judgment entered after the effective date
of the Act could be enforced against any joint tort-feasor only
to the extent of that joint tort-feasor's percentage of fault.
Accordingly, as to any judgment entered after the effective date
of the Act, the right to contribution would be unnecessary.

*

The

Since the right of action for contribution does not accrue until
one of several joint tort-feasors has paid more than his pro rata
share of liability, Unigard Insurance Company v. City of
LaVerkin, 689 P.2d 1344 (Utah 1984), the provision of the Liability Reform Act abolishing contribution would eliminate the right
to contribution of any joint tort-feasor who had not before the
effective date of the Act paid more than his pro rata share of
liability.
-10-

Act's abolition of the right to contribution would be entirely
consistent with the elimination of joint and several liability in
all cases where judgment was not entered before the Act's effective date.
In the present case, judgment was entered

after the

effective date of the Liability Reform Act which abolished the
doctrine of joint and several liability.

Accordingly, at the

time the Act went into effect, plaintiff had no vested right in
the doctrine of joint and several liability.

Plaintiff was not,

therefore, entitled to collect 100% of her judgment from defendant.

This case must be reversed and remanded with instructions

to the trial court to order plaintiff to refund to defendant 75%
of the amount plaintiff recovered, plus interest.

III.
IT IS NOT APPROPRIATE TO LOOK
TO LEGISLATIVE INTENT TO
RESOLVE THIS APPEAL
In part B under Point I of her brief, plaintiff argues
that the Legislature intended the Liability Reform Act's provision relating to the abolition of joint and several liability to
apply only to causes of action arising after the Act's effective
date.

Plaintiff quotes statements made by two State Senators and

the Act's principal draftsman
-11-

in support of that proposition.

These statements, however, cannot be considered
statements of legislative

intent.

as definitive

They are merely individual

statements of opinion and do not reflect any general intent of
the legislature.

If the legislature had truly wanted to manifest

its intent, it could have done so as it has done on numerous
occasions, by expressly so providing in the legislation.

See,

e.g. , U.C.A., § 78-16-1.
In any event, the intent expressed by those statements
is contrary to the established rules of law for determining the
effect of the Act as explained in Point II above.

Consequently,

this Court need not give any weight to the statements to which
plaintiff refers since they are contrary to the law regarding the
vesting of the right to collect pursuant to joint and several
liability.

Legislative

intent

should

not be substituted

for

established rules of interpretation.

IV.
THE ACTIONS OF JOHN DOE
CONSTITUTE AN INTENTIONAL
TORT FOR WHICH INSTRUCTION
SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN
In her responsive

brief, the plaintiff

asserts that

defendant was not entitled to a duty of care instruction on
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intentional torts because the conduct did not amount to an intentional tort.
An examination of the recordf at Trans., pp. 67-68 and
112, shows that the defendant raised the issue of the need for
instructions on an intentional tort.
Plaintiff

attempts to rely upon Matheson v. Pearson,

619 P.2d 321 (Utah 1980), to establish that the activity described here was not an intentional tort.

The case is distinguished

from this one on two principal bases.
Matheson

was

concerned

summary judgment.

with

whether

The first basis is that
facts

existed

to defeat

This Court held only that the facts alleged

could be found to constitute negligence rather than an intentional tort.

There was no finding that the activity of the defendant

in Matheson was merely negligent as a matter of law.

Consequent-

ly, Matheson is of little use in resolving this appeal.
The second basis for distinguishing Matheson is that it
reported the testimony of the tort-feasor as stating he did not
intend to do any harm.
Doe

deliberately

The testimony in this case is that John

knocked

down

another

patron

seconds

before

knocking down the plaintiff and shouted something to the effect
that:

"I got another one".

T. , p. 5.

This statement clearly

implies an intentional act intended to result in some harm.
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Defendant

attempted

to have

the jury

consider the

standard of care for an intentional tort by offering Instruction
27 which was prefaced, "Should you determine that the plaintiff
was deliberately knocked down. . • ." This introductory phrase
to the instruction proposed to the jury that they could consider
whether the action was intentional and gave them a standard of
care to apply should they so find.
clear

guidelines

to apply

The failure to give the jury

to the evidence

left

them

without

direction which was reversible error.

CONCLUSION
The appellant respectfully requests the Court to reverse the judgment entered by the District Court for failure to
properly instruct the jury and/or to declare the Liability Reform
Act applicable to this case.
DATED this 10th day of February, 1987.
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.
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